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Abstract
The performance of many of the technologies
used in physical protection systems that guard highvalue assets are heavily influenced by weather and
visibility conditions as well as intruder capabilities.
This complicates the already difficult problem of
optimizing the design of multi-layered physical
protection systems. This paper develops an
optimization model for the automatic design of these
systems with explicit consideration of the impact of
weather and visibility conditions as well as intruder
capabilities on system performance. An illustrative
case study is provided.

1. Introduction
The automatic design of a multi-layered physical
protection system (PPS), such as those guarding
high-value assets, requires the efficient creation and
evaluation of various security architectures without
performing an exhaustive enumeration of all possible
options. The efficacy of a design should not only
consider the delay and detection characteristics, but
must also consider the impact that system
nuisance/false alarm rates have on the alarm station
operators. Additionally, the architecture must be
resilient to a variety of environmental conditions and
intruder types which impact sensor and barrier
performance. The naïve approach of using the
average-case representation of the PPS performance
characteristics tends to generate an architecture that is
highly vulnerable to the worst case scenario and is
shown to be inferior to the stochastic optimization
approach presented in this paper.
An established approach to evaluating a PPS is to
use adversary sequence diagrams (ASDs) to describe
the layers of protection that the attacker must pass
through in order to reach a target [6]. An ASD
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typically includes defining detection and delay values
for each element along a path to the target. It often
represents adjacent areas in diagrams using
concentric rectangles. We utilize a layered approach
as well, but one that is two-dimensional and focused
on the actual physical system layout. For example,
impassable obstacles or buildings are represented as
voids on the system grid. [3] describes the integration
of a human-generated PPS design modeled in 3-D
with 2-D design evaluation models. [8] and [11]
describe a simulation for design of PPSs integrating
Systematic Analysis of Vulnerability to Intrusion
(SAVI) [10] for most vulnerable path (MVP)
selection. Our approach uses a 2-D projection of a 3D facility model with automated path identification,
architecture generation and evaluation based on
allowable design alternatives, intruder capabilities,
and environmental factors. As such, our approach
reduces PPS design time when compared to [3], [8],
[10] and [11] by combining standard MVP design
factors to automatically generate architectures, and
improves resilience to multiple environmental
scenarios. It also creates architectures that trade off
performance against investment cost so that decision
makers can select the most effective PPS within a
fixed budget.
[5] develops an optimization model to select
mitigation measures for physical security using
historical data on the effectiveness of specific
mitigation measures and a multiplicative model to
integrate these effects together. In contrast, we
employ a game theoretic approach to model the
decision-making of the intruder, thereby computing
more directly the impacts of security measures. [12]
uses Dempster-Shafer evidence theory to develop a
risk map of a given architecture and then optimizes
that risk map via sensor placement based on a
modified averaging approach for belief functions. [7]
develops a shortest path algorithm to determine the
MVP in a security system. We adopt this
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computation with some modifications
implementation described in [4].

to

the

2. Model formulation
The model developed in this paper extends the
model given in [4] in two significant dimensions.
First, scenarios are used to describe the connection
between weather, visibility conditions and intruder
capabilities with detection probability. Second, the
probability of interruption given detection (PI) is now
computed including the impact of nuisance and false
alarm rates (NAR/FAR) on operator performance as
described in [1]. These modifications yield a more
realistic and comprehensive optimization model
compared to previous work by treating the alarm
station operator (ASO) as an integral part of the PPS
and the various environmental scenarios as design
considerations.
Suppose there is a network that connects a
location with a target. Each link in the network (i,j)
represents places in which security technology may
be located as well as links in the path that the intruder
may take. For simplicity we refer to a feasible
collection of security technologies for a particular
𝑦
link (i,j) as a package. Hence, let 𝐼𝑖𝑗 be a binary
variable that takes on a value of 1 if investment
package y is placed on arc (i,j) and 0 otherwise.
Feasible collections of technologies that can be
placed on an arc must be used instead of directly
representing the individual technologies, because the
combined effects are not generally the same as the
sum of the effects of the individual technologies. For
example, the probability of detection, (PD), on an arc
when two different technologies are employed is not
𝑦
the sum of the two probabilities. 𝑐𝑖𝑗 is the cost of
𝑠𝑦
investment package y on link (i,j) and 𝐴𝑖𝑗 is the
NAR/FAR for investment package y on link (i,j)
under scenario s. Further, r is an index for the paths
that connect the intruder origin with the target of
interest. Let 𝑧 𝑟𝑠 be a binary variable that takes on a
value of 1 if path r is taken under scenario s. Finally,
let 𝑔𝑟𝑠 be the PI for path r under scenario s.

𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑟𝑠 𝑟𝑠
𝑦
𝐼𝑖𝑗 [ 𝑧 𝑟𝑠 ∑ 𝑔 𝑧 ]
𝑟
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑠𝑦 𝑦
𝑦
𝐼𝑖𝑗 [∑𝑖𝑗 ∑𝑦 𝐴𝑖𝑗 𝐼𝑖𝑗 ]
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑦 𝑦
𝑦
𝐼𝑖𝑗 [∑𝑖𝑗 ∑𝑦 𝑐𝑖𝑗 𝐼𝑖𝑗 ]
Such that

(1)

∑𝑟 𝑧 𝑟𝑠 = 1 ∀𝑠
𝑧 𝑟𝑠 ∈ {0,1} ∀𝑟, 𝑠
𝑦
𝐼𝑖𝑗 ∈ {0,1} ∀(𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑦

(2)
(3)
(4)

Equation (1) describes the three objectives of the
system owner. The first objective maximizes the PI
the intruder faces. The inner objective expresses the
desire of the intruder to minimize their probability of
interruption given detection, PI, by finding the most
vulnerable path. Notice that this is done assuming
that an architecture is in place and searching over all
paths and all scenarios. The outer objective
represents the system owner, who is searching over
all possible architectures via the decision variables
𝑦
𝐼𝑖𝑗 , to identify the architecture that maximizes the PI.
It is important to realize that the PI for a given
architecture is scenario-dependent because the PD for
a sensor is dependent on the environmental
conditions. Hence for a given architecture, we use the
lowest PI across all environmental conditions (i.e., all
scenarios). This is a conservative assumption because
it assumes that the intruder has sufficient knowledge
to identify the environmental conditions that will
maximize their chance of success.
The second objective minimizes the NAR/FAR.
The third objective minimizes system costs. These
three terms identify a three-dimensional design space
from which the optimal architecture is selected.
Equation (2) requires that the intruder select a single
path under each scenario. Equations (3) and (4) give
the binary restrictions on the decision variables.
Many investments are only effective if they are
deployed as a cycle or a contiguous boundary instead
of possibly disconnected, single-link investments as
described in [4]. Consequently, we make use of
“layered” investments where a single investment
layer consists of a collection of link investments of a
single type (e.g., sensor “sX” investments) forming a
contiguous boundary around the target at a fixed
radius. This strategy decreases the computational
complexity by several orders of magnitude while still
maintaining high quality solutions.
All link travel times and the Response Force
Time (RFT) are treated as Gaussian random variables
with a standard deviation of 10% of the mean.
Additionally, we treat the ASO processing time
(assessment plus queue waiting time), which has a
calculated mean value as described in [1], as a
Gaussian random variable with a 10% standard
deviation. The resultant probability that the RFT
(augmented by the ASO processing time) is less than
the intruder travel time to the target (after detection)
is given by equation (5).
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∑𝑗≥𝑖 𝜇𝑗 −(𝜇𝑅 +𝜇𝐴𝑆 )

𝑃(𝑇𝑅+𝐴𝑆 < 𝑇𝐴𝑇 ) = 𝑃(𝑇𝑖 ) = 𝜑 [∑

2
2
2
𝑗≥𝑖 𝜎𝑗 +(𝜎𝑅 +𝜎𝐴𝑆 )

]

(5)
Where the subscript R is used for the RFT, AS for
the ASO processing time, AT for the attacker travel
time post detection, i for the index of the link where
initial detection occurred, and j for the link index
across all indices after detection. The overall PI based
on the PD on link i, Di, can then be written as
equation (6).
𝑃(𝐼) = 𝐷1 𝑃(𝑇1 ) + ∑𝑛𝑖=2 𝐷𝑖 𝑃(𝑇𝑖 ) ∏𝑖−1
𝑗=1(1 − 𝐷𝑗 ) (6)
These equations are extensions of the ones
defined in [9], which are based on seminal work on P I
in [2], also described in [6]. Since this probability
becomes vanishingly small when the initial detection
is close to the target, we set a threshold to ignore low
probability paths (PI = 0.1) which mitigates the
multipath issue described in [4] when trying to find
the MVP (the path with the lowest PI).

3. Solution procedure
The solution procedure for generating the
candidate security architectures uses an investment
planning optimization, similar to the one presented in
[4]. A genetic algorithm (GA) determines the best
mix of investments to apply to the network based on
an objective composed of investment cost,
NAR/FAR, and PI. To provide a more realistic RFT,
we include an assessment time based on system
NAR/FAR using the ASO model described in [1].
Since the investments are now collected in
synergistic layers, there is no need to use the region
crossover method for genetic crossover as done
previously in [4], hence a traditional random cut
procedure is used. Each child produced is postprocessed to guarantee feasibility by ensuring that at
least one layer of each investment type (delay,
detection, and ASO) is included, since anything less
creates an infeasible solution. If no ASO investments
are initially selected, then the minimum number
required to keep the NAR/FAR per operator within
the “low” range of alarms per day (as defined in [1])
is added. If multiple ASO layers are selected, then the
layer with the least number of operators that can
feasibly process all alarms is kept, with all others
removed.
The initial population is created using a two-stage
greedy algorithm, where the first stage creates the
minimum required delay strategy, and the second
stage adds the detection layers required to give a P I
above a minimum threshold.

The delay stage uses a modified objective that
trades off time delay versus investment cost. The
minimum path delay must exceed the RFT plus the
minimum ASO assessment time with a probability
greater than 0.95. The delay investment layers are
sorted by incremental benefit (ratio of added delay to
investment cost) and applied until the minimum
probability is met or exceeded. The detection stage
uses a trade-off between investment costs,
NAR/FAR, and PI. The detection layers are initially
sorted by decreasing PD, increasing distance from
target, increasing NAR/FAR, and increasing cost (in
that order). The sorted collection of investments is
applied to the network until PI is greater than a small
threshold (0.1). The minimum number of ASOs
required to accommodate the investment NAR/FAR
is determined concurrently and is applied as part of
the initial investment strategy. At this point, the
remaining unused layers (both delay and detection)
are sorted by incremental benefit (ratio of increase in
PI to investment cost) and applied until the minimum
PI is met or exceeded. Note that the minimum P I is
generally quite large (on the order of 99%) and the
trade-off cost for each detection investment includes
the cost of any additional ASOs above those required
for the initial investment strategy.
The initial population consists of the greedy
investment strategy, as well as a significant number
of random strategies (on the order of 1,000). This
initial population is used to form the initial efficient
frontier, which is then augmented by cleaning and
decimating the efficient frontier and top 5% of
solutions closest to the efficient frontier. The
cleaning process randomly removes as many
investment layers as possible without significantly
decreasing PI for each solution examined. The
decimation process examines each of the cleaned
solutions and randomly removes single investment
layers, adding each modified solution to the
population of solutions (and the efficient frontier, if
appropriate) as long as the newly created solution has
a PI above a given threshold (in all experiments in
this paper we use 50%).

4. Case study
The illustrative case study is an 11x11 grid with
the target in the center. This yields 121 nodes and
420 arcs in the resultant network. Each scenario is
based on the intruder’s ability to degrade different
investments combined with the environmental
conditions. We assume that the probability of
detection for each sensor, PD, is impacted differently
by the environmental conditions. Table 1 gives the
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environmental conditions and their probability of
occurrence.
Table 1. Notional environmental scenarios
Environmental
Conditions

Abbreviation

Daytime No
Precipitation
Daytime With
Precipitation
Nighttime No
Precipitation
Nighttime With
Precipitation

DNP

Probability
of
Occurrence
0.5

DWP

0.1

NNP

0.3

NWP

0.1

For the purpose of this example, each scenario
has two elements: one of the four environmental
conditions given in Table 1 and the capability of the
intruder. The capabilities of the intruder influence PD
for each sensor (sX, sY, and sZ) as well as the time it
takes for the intruder to overcome each fence (F).
Table 2 gives notional values (PD for sensors and
delay time in seconds for fences) based on the
environmental conditions specified in Table 1.
Table 2. Notional intruder sensor/barrier
degrade capabilities under different
environmental conditions
DNP
Tech.
sX
sY
sZ
F

N
0.80
0.85
0.60
60

Tech.
sX
sY
sZ
F

N
0.4
0.45
0.53
70

DWP
D
0.70
0.75
0.55
30

N
0.70
0.82
0.95
70

D
0.30
0.30
0.47
40

N
0.35
0.50
0.85
80

NNP

D
0.60
0.75
0.8
40

Table 3: Notional investment cost, NAR/FAR
and average/worst case performance
Tech.
sX
sY
sZ
F
ASO

10-year
Cost
($1000s)
$100
$200
$300
$3
$10,000

NAR
/FAR

Average

Worst
Case

3
6
12
0
N/A

0.58
0.64
0.61
51.5
N/A

0.3
0.3
0.47
30
N/A

5. Results
Figure 1 shows the estimated efficient frontier
where the three objectives pursued are the worst case
PI (across weather and visibility conditions and
attacker types), NAR/FAR (given by the labels) and
cost. Only points that had a worst case PI that exceeds
90% are shown. The architectures range from $120
million to almost $194 million. The $194 million
architecture has a worst case PI = 96.5%.
Figure 2 gives a graph of the average PI across all
scenarios in comparison to the worst case. To create
an average value, each intruder type is assumed to be
equally likely. This assumption does not impact the
optimization because it optimizes across all eight
scenarios (four weather and two types of intruders)
and focuses on the PI from the scenario that produces
the highest vulnerability. The average difference is
on the order of 5%. However, the largest difference is
about 7.5%. The average performance for the
architecture that costs about $194 million with a
worst case PI = 96.5% has an average PI = 99.3%.

NWP
D
0. 30
0.47
0.75
60

N, D: Normal & Degraded

Table 3 gives the cost, NAR/FAR, and average
and worst case detection probabilities for each
technology. The last row gives the cost for an ASO.
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$200

investment layers closest to the target, underscoring
the desire to slow an intruder down after detection,
giving the ASOs and response force sufficient time to
respond. Second, a diverse collection of sensors is
placed towards the outer perimeter of the grid. The
diversity ensures that the architecture is effective
against all scenarios, as different sensor types are
better suited for different environmental conditions.
The sensors are most beneficial farther away from the
target, since early detection gives the ASOs and
response force more time to respond. This sensor
placement strategy results in a high NAR/FAR,
necessitating the employment of a large number of
ASOs. This solution suggests 5 ASOs to combat the
almost 1,300 NAR/FAR.

1,296

10-year cost ($ thousands)

$190
504
$180
$170

540
1,152

$160

684

756
504

$150

432

432
756 756
576 684
432
756

$140
$130

1,080
756

432

$120
576

$110
$100
0.88

0.90

0.92

0.94

0.96

0.98

Worst Case PI

Figure 1. Estimated efficient frontier
(solutions with worse case performance that
exceeds 90% PI)

0.995
0.0411

0.99
0.0439
0.0517

0.985

Average Pl

0.0283
0.0307
0.0306
0.0403
0.0531
0.0547

0.0583
0.0546

0.0706 0.0569
0.0716
0.054
0.0745
0.044

0.98

0.975

Figure 3. Illustrative solution on efficient
frontier (Worst-Case PI = 0.9647, Average PI =
0.993, 5 ASO)

0.97
0.0643

0.965

0.0421

0.96
0.88

0.9

0.92

0.94

0.96

0.98

Worst Case PI
Figure 2. Average PI vs. worst case for
solutions on the frontier given in Figure 1
The best performing (highest P I on average and
worst case) efficient solutions tend to have several
key physical characteristics, as illustrated by the PPS
architecture in Figure 3. First, fences are built in the

High-performing solutions like those in Figure 3
are also extremely costly. In order to reduce the cost
of a solution without drastically reducing
performance, a typical strategy is to remove sensors
from the outermost investment layers, where many
sensors are needed per layer. This also reduces
NAR/FAR, which means that fewer ASOs are
required.
Figure 4 (10-year cost of $119.8M) illustrates a
much cheaper but less effective alternative to the
solution in Figure 3 (10-year cost of $193.8M), with
the expensive but high-performing sY and sZ sensors
removed from the outer layer. These two solutions
represent the extremes of the efficient frontier
pictured in Figure 1.
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As an alternative to the stochastic program, a
single scenario could be used with average values for
the sensor detection probabilities and the fence delay
times based on the likelihood of each of the weather
conditions and the two types of intruders. A
comparison of the value of the solutions identified
via this average scenario and those given in Figure 1
provides insight into the value of the stochastic
program. To perform this computation, we now use
the probability of each scenario explicitly in the
optimization.

The PI of the average scenario is 93.7%; however, the
true average is 79%, and the worst case is 62%.
Finally, the worst case is generally substantially
worse than the true average. The average difference
between the true average and the worst case is about
19%, but that difference reaches about 42% in one of
the scenarios.
In contrast, the solutions from Figure 1 (indicated
by the squares) have an average performance that is
within about 5% of the worst case. The objective
does not reward solutions for which the performance
is particularly good on some scenarios. Rather, it
focuses the trade-off analysis on maximizing PI for
the worst-case scenario (the scenario to which the
system is most vulnerable). If we are to assume that
the intruder is knowledgeable, this is advantageous.
1

0.9995

Optimize with
Average Values

0.9

Optimize Worst
Case

Worst Case PI

0.8
0.9365

0.7

0.9552

0.6

0.946

Figure 5 gives a comparison of the efficient
solutions based on an average scenario (circles) and
the solutions given in Figure 1 (squares). The
diagonal line in Figure 5 indicates solutions for
which the worst case PI is the same as the average
(hence there is no variability in the PI across
scenarios). Solutions that are close to this line have
less variability in the PI across scenarios.
The labels are the PI reported by the optimization
for the estimate of the efficient frontier using a single
average scenario. Notice that the true mean PI across
all scenarios is generally lower than what the
optimization suggests is the PI (using only the single
average scenario). The average difference between
the true average and what the optimization reports is
the PI is about 9%. Second, there are some solutions
for which the optimization reports that the PI is
greater than 90% but the true average across all the
scenarios for this architecture is less than 90%. The
point labeled with an arrow is just such a situation.

0.9996

0.86

0.5

Figure 4. Illustrative solution on efficient
frontier (Worst-Case PI = 0.9016, Average PI
= 0.9761, 3 ASO)

0.9815

0.9808

0.8573
0.4
0.75

0.8

0.85

0.9

0.95

1

True Average PI
Figure 5. Comparison of the efficient
solutions based on an average scenario and
the solutions given in Figure 1

6. Conclusion
In order to design a PPS that is resilient to a
variety of weather scenarios and intruders with
enhanced capabilities, it is critical that a scenariobased optimization approach be employed. As
demonstrated by our analysis, trying to create a
system that performs well against a spectrum of
factors by using an average-case representation of the
PPS performance characteristics tends to generate an
architecture that is highly vulnerable to the worst
case scenario.
Additional research is valuable in at least the
following three areas. First, this model assumed a
single attacker identifying the weakest path during
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the most vulnerable weather and visibility conditions.
In practice there may be locations which, if attacked,
render other defenses less potent, such as a control
center for video surveillance feed, for example. This
opens up the possibility that teams of attackers
working collectively with different goals may be able
to create more potent attacks. Second, this model
assumed that the ASOs process alarms in the order
received and that there is no priority among the
alarms. In practice, some alarms are more reliable
than others and some are more important due to their
location in the PPS. Integrating priority queuing ideas
into the modeling is valuable. Finally, this analysis
assumed that each sensor had a fixed NAR/FAR. For
many sensors, it is likely that the weather conditions
and visibility impact the NAR/FAR. This is easy to
incorporate but is also very likely to suggest that
ASO staffing could fluctuate based on the
environmental conditions.
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